T
rust negotiation is an approach to access control whereby access is granted based on trust established in a negotiation between the service requester and the service provider. 1 In this negotiation, credentials -signed assertions that describe the owner's attributes -are exchanged iteratively to build trust between the negotiation participants. Credentials are typically based on standards such as X.509v3, 2 simple public key infrastructure (SPKI), 3 or Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). 4 Trust negotiation systems avoid several problems facing traditional access control models such as DAC (discretionary access control) and MAC (mandatory access control). 5 Scalability problems arise, for example, when attempting to store identity information for each requester. Another problem is that Web service providers often do not know requesters' identities in advance because of the ubiquitousness of services. These problems are accentuated in Web service environments because the services typically have large, dynamic requester populations.
Several issues remain to be addressed in existing trust negotiation systems. (See the "Related Work in Trust Negotiation" sidebar on page 46.) Specifying trust negotiation policies still requires time-consuming hand coding and lowlevel programming. Because policy specification and enforcement are not clearly separated, policy enforcement often requires ad hoc implementations that do not scale well. 6 Using high-level visual models to represent policies makes them easier to comprehend (and thus, to modify). It also permits information generation for controlling negotiations.
In this article we describe Trust-Serv, our trust negotiation framework for Web services, which features a policy language based on state machines. It is supported by lifecycle management and automated runtime enforcement tools. Credential retrieval and validation in Trust-Serv rely on predefined Web services that provide interactions with attribute assertion authorities and public key infrastructure.
Trust Negotiation Framework
Trust-Serv, our model-driven, unified framework for trust negotiation and access control in Web services, leverages several established standards and emphasizes flexible lifecycle policy management, which is often overlooked in policy model design.
We introduce an extended state machine model to associate policies with resources (that is, service operations and credentials). State machines, which are made up of states and transitions, are widely used to describe the behavior of reactive systems. 7 We chose the state machine model because it is simple, well known, and possesses a formal semantics. In Trust-Serv, the states represent resources to be protected. Transitions link the states together, and we label the transitions with conditions that must be satisfied before Trust-Serv grants access to protected resources. We extend transitions beyond traditional state machines to capture additional security-related abstractions, such as credential disclosures, provisions, and obligations. Our model visualizes the gradual trust establishment as the negotiating parties advance through each others' negotiation policies. Different states then correspond to different access rights.
Based on our policy model, we present strategies that allow Trust-Serv to migrate ongoing negotiations to new policies. These strategies make it possible to deploy updated policies without causing disruption to running negotiations.
We also propose a container-centric architecture to enforce trust negotiation policies. A container is a collection of components, where each component performs some management function for the Web service. Examples of such functions include exception handling, conversation management, service level agreement (SLA) monitoring, and trust negotiation. This architecture's main advantage is that the security mechanisms are transparent to the Web service. Moreover, because it requires no modifications to the service, the architecture enables automated and scalable 1 While trust is established by certificates, these systems specify authorizations using requesters' public keys, which must therefore be known in advance. In the simple public key infrastructure (SPKI), 2 certificates explicitly state the authorizations assigned to the requester. This approach is inflexible in environments where policies change frequently. In more recent trust management systems, such as the IBM Trust Establishment framework, 1 certificates are used to map users to roles. The X-Sec 3 language describes security policies for Web documents on the basis of user attributes found in credentials. None of these proposals supports trust negotiation -that is, iterative disclosure of credentials by both requester and provider.
RT is a role-based trust management framework that includes a family of logicbased languages. 4 One of these languages allows developers to map users to roles based on credential attributes.This framework also contains credential-chain discovery algorithms to collect credentials not found locally. Such credential discovery is an important part of any trust management framework. Unlike our framework, however, the RT framework does not consider evolution of negotiation policies or migration of negotiation instances.
Bonatti and Samarati proposed a unified framework for regulating access to network services and information disclosure. 5 Their framework consists of a logic-based policy language and an interaction model that uses prerequisite rules to avoid unnecessary policy disclosure. Our work differs from theirs both in how policies are specified and in our support for policy lifecycle management.
The TrustBuilder framework 6 focuses on trust negotiation strategies and protocols. Strategies control which credentials to disclose, when to disclose them, and when to terminate a negotiation. The strategies are designed to work together with policies. If a policy determines that a credential might be disclosed to the other party, the strategy determines whether the disclosure is necessary, and when it should take place. Our work is complementary to this work, as their strategies can be modified for use with our policy language. Additionally, our work can be used to provide policy lifecycle management in TrustBuilder.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing trust management or trust negotiation systems has addressed the issues of policy lifecycle management.
deployment of the trust negotiation infrastructure. We will focus here on the trust negotiation components of the container.
Trust Negotiation State Machines
Web service interactions occur between service requesters and service providers. Requesters and providers own credentials that may be used to negotiate trust. In addition, the service operated by the provider contains operations that requesters invoke. Both requesters and providers use trust negotiation policies to restrict access to their credentials and to service operations. A trust negotiation policy specifies which credentialsor other resources -to disclose at a given execution state of the negotiation, and the conditions to disclose them. Figure 1a shows an example of a trust negotiation policy for a service provider, while Figure 1b shows a requester's trust negotiation policy. Trust-Serv interprets requester policies the same way it does provider policies. Because the requester policy constructs are a subset of those used for a provider policy (requesters might not have service operations), we focus on provider policies. Figure 1a shows a trust negotiation policy for an airline ticket reservation and booking service. A requester can proceed to state A, from which it can invoke the Flight Search and Register operations and retrieve the Verified by Visa provider credential. The requester must disclose a Frequent Flyer credential from Acme to proceed to state B and invoke the Domestic Reservation operation. Alternatively, the requester can proceed to state B by executing the Register operation, which lets customers who do not possess Frequent Flyer credentials register for the airline's frequent flyer program. Because credentials and service operations are cumulative, a requester at any state has access to service operations and credentials available at all states visited, including the current one. Each state has a transition to a final state, which fires if the negotiation is aborted or completed. For clarity, we omit all the final states except state F in Figure 1a .
State Machine Example

States
The resources protected by the trust negotiation policy include service operations and credentials. Service operations are the operations of the Web service, which requesters can invoke. Credentials are considered resources because they often contain sensitive information; thus, their disclosure should be restricted. Trust-Serv maps these resources to the states of the policy, and access rights depend on the negotiation's state. For each state a requester visits, Trust-Serv adds the resources of that state to the set of resources that are already available to the requester. For example, consider the policy in Figure 1a . If a requester visits state A and then proceeds to state B, all the service operations and credentials available to the requester at state A are still available to the requester in state B. Access rights thus depend on all states the requester visits.
Because access rights are only added and never removed, the policy language is monotonic; that is, additional credential disclosures will grant either additional or no further access rights. If the opposite were true, and privileges could be revoked on the basis of additional credential disclosures, requesters could easily avoid this privilege reduction by choosing not to disclose the credentials to the provider. However, in most cases it is possible to instead require the disclosure of a credential that positively accomplishes the task by proving the opposite. For example, instead of removing privileges if the requester submits a convicted criminal credential, the policy might specify that these privileges can be obtained only on disclosure of a credential certifying that the requester is not a convicted criminal. The requester chooses transitions on the basis of two criteria. The requester first narrows the choice according to which service operation is to be invoked. Transitions are considered only if they are part of a path that leads to a state containing the service operation the requester desires. Second, the transition must be compatible with the requester's own trust negotiation policy (if the transition requires the requester to disclose a credential, the requester's policy must allow this disclosure).
We use transitions to extend the state machine model by capturing additional security abstractions. These abstractions include credential disclosures, provisions, obligations, and timeouts. TrustServ specifies these abstractions as conditions that must be satisfied before transitions are triggered.
Credential disclosure. This transition requires the requester to disclose one or more credentials. Additionally, it might constrain the credential's attribute values. 2 For example, in Figure 1a , one of the transitions from state A to state B requires the requester to submit a credential of type Frequent Flyer. Additionally, the credential must contain an attribute Company with value Acme.
Provision or obligation. Provisions require the requester to perform some action before proceeding, whereas obligations require the requester to perform some action in the future. 8 We represent such actions by service operations. The transition between states A and B (shown with a dashed line in Figure 1a ) is a provision, requiring the requester to execute the Register operation to proceed to state B. This transition offers an alternative to the credential-disclosure transition between states A and B.
Timed. If the requester does not take action within a given period, the provider might force a transition to another state. Each timed transition has a time frame in which requesters must take some action. If the time frame elapses before the requester acts, a timeout event occurs and the transition is triggered. This transition type is most commonly used to abort abandoned negotiations by forcing them to a final state. Figure 1a shows an example of such a timed transition between states A and F: If the requester does not take any action within 10 minutes of entering state A, the negotiation enters the final state. (Figure 1b shows her policy.) To search for available flights, she first invokes the Flight Search service operation, which is available at state A of the provider policy. Alice can proceed to this state and invoke the operation without disclosing any credentials.
Example Scenario
Once she locates a flight, Alice wishes to make a reservation. To access the Domestic Reservation operation, she can choose between two possible transitions to reach state B. One requires her to disclose her Frequent Flyer credential; the other is a provision that requires her to execute the Register operation. Alice possesses a Frequent Flyer credential from Acme, and according to her policy, she is willing to disclose it.
Finally, Alice wants to book the ticket using the Domestic Booking operation at state D. To proceed, she needs to disclose her address and credit card. While she is willing to show her address, she will disclose her credit card only to a provider that discloses its Verified by Visa credential. Fortunately, this credential was available at state A. Once Alice receives the provider credential, she discloses her credit card and address and proceeds to state D, where she invokes the booking operation.
Policy Lifecycle Management
In dynamic Web service environments, policies might need to accommodate new business strategies, changes to laws and regulations, emerging competitors, and so on. 9 Lifecycle managementthat is, the creation, evolution, and management of policies -is a challenging issue in process modeling techniques. 10 Our focus here is to address the lifecycle management issues in the context of trust negotiation policies for Web services.
Migration Strategies
When a service provider deploys a new policy, simply aborting and restarting all current negotiations is not appropriate for several reasons. For one thing, a considerable amount of work might be lost, and the number of ongoing negotiations might be so high that aborting and restarting would severely disrupt other dependent services. The problem is even more critical in the case of long-running services, such as purchase order approval or employee relocation management, as both the likelihood of having policy changes during each service execution and the amount of work lost by aborting the service increase in a very significant way.
Negotiation migration strategies permit providers to move (migrate) negotiations to new policies under certain circumstances. When a policy is modified, Trust-Serv provides three possible migration strategies: concurrent to completion, migration to new policy, or abort.
Concurrent to completion.
This strategy lets negotiations in progress be completed according to the old policy, but requires all new negotiations to follow the new policy. The enforcement system needs to enforce both policies until all negotiations following the old policy are complete.
Migration to new policy. This strategy migrates all existing negotiations to the new policy. This is possible if a negotiation following the old policy can be seen as a negotiation following the new policy. In other words, the parts of the old policy explored by the negotiation are the same as in the new policy. This means that all states visited and all transitions triggered by the negotiation must exist in both policies.
Negotiations that satisfy this property are said to be compliant to the new policy. Trust-Serv migrates compliant negotiations to the new policy unconditionally, while noncompliant negotiations are rolled back until they reach a state at which they are compliant to the new policy. In the worst case, this could cause the negotiation to be restarted. If the provider chooses this strategy, the runtime system temporarily suspends ongoing negotiations and determines which negotiations must be rolled back. It then replaces the old policy with the new one, and negotiations resume.
Abort. This strategy aborts all running negotiations. All existing negotiation instances are destroyed and must be restarted.
Migration Example
Suppose that Acme, the provider, changed the policy in Figure 1a to require the requester to submit a Passport credential for the credential disclosure transition between states A and C, while removing the Passport credential requirement from the transition between states C and E. Suppose further that a current negotiation had reached state C when the policy change occurred.
If the provider uses the abort strategy, the negotiation is cancelled and must be restarted. This is simple, but it might be considered a suboptimal solution because of the lost work.
The concurrent-to-completion strategy lets the negotiation continue according to the old policy. This lets the requester in our example access the service operation International Booking without disclosing its Passport credential. The provider must decide whether to allow this. If it considers this unacceptable, the provider must choose another strategy.
Using the migration-to-new-policy strategy, the system first determines whether the negotiation is compliant to the new policy. The credential disclosure transition between states A and C has been fired by this negotiation. Since this transition was changed in the new policy, the negotiation is not compliant to the new policy. Trust-Serv then rolls back the negotiation to state A, where the negotiation resumes following the new policy.
Architecture and Implementation
We believe that Web service development and deployment can be automated to a substantially higher level by factoring common chores into the middleware. Figure 2 (next page) shows an overview of our architecture, which uses Web service containers to manage the internal behavior of the underlying service and its interactions. Containers provide the components necessary for Web services to support trust negotiation, as well as other functionalities, such as conversation management and exception handling. The service container's runtime operation is directed by policies, such as trust negotiation policies, that can be defined for individual Web services or groups of them.
This architecture enables developers who want to create a new service to simply implement the service's business logic and specify the trust negotiation policy. The Web service delegates tasks such as controlling negotiation instances and ver-ifying credentials to the container, thereby considerably simplifying development.
Our Trust-Serv prototype leverages existing standards, such as XML key management specification (XKMS) 11 and SAML, 4 to verify, encode, and collect credentials. The implementation is an extension of the existing Self-Serv platform, 12 which supports Web service development based on standards such as SOAP, Web Service Description Language (WSDL), and universal description, discovery, and integration (UDDI).
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Negotiation Modeler
The negotiation modeler is a CASE-like (computeraided software engineering) tool for Web service trust negotiation policies; it assists policy developers in specifying and modifying negotiation policies, and it lets developers map resources (service operations and provider credentials) to states. The modeler lets developers edit negotiation policies through a visual interface that provides an editor for describing a trust negotiation policy's state machine diagram. It also describes the conditions of transitions.
The negotiation modeler generates control tables from state machine policy specifications. Each control table contains a set of Event[Condition]/Action (E[C]/A) tuples that describe transitions out of, and the service operations and credentials available at, the given state. The modeler generates these tables statically by analyzing the trust negotiation policy. The control tables are stored as XML documents.
• Events represent messages received from the service requester. These messages might contain credentials that the requester discloses, requests for credentials owned by the provider, or invocation of operations of the provider's Web service. Timeout (associated with timed transitions) is the only event that does not represent messages from the requester. Instead, this event is signaled by the provider.
• Conditions are either restrictions on attribute values in credentials or deadlines for performing obligations. When an event occurs, the corresponding action is executed only if the con- 
Negotiation Controller
The negotiation controller intercepts all messages between the requester and the provider. Once an invocation has been authorized, the controller forwards it to the service. The control tables show what action the controller should take when events occur. At runtime, the controller is responsible for receiving negotiation messages (such as credential disclosures and service-invocation requests), determining whether to create or destroy negotiation examples, presenting transitions to requesters according to their paths, and triggering transitions if their conditions are met. The controller also discloses provider credentials and forwards service-invocation requests if permitted by the policy.
The negotiation controller comprises a container and a set of objects. There is one container per service, and the objects represent negotiation instances. Because it is necessary to maintain state for both requester and provider during negotiations, a unique object is tied to each negotiation for its entire duration. The container dynamically spawns and destroys negotiation instances on the fly, as needed. When it receives a message, the container forwards it to the appropriate negotiation instance for processing. However, if it receives a message that does not belong to any existing negotiation, it spawns a new instance. Once a negotiation is completed or terminated, the corresponding negotiation instance is no longer needed and is therefore destroyed by the container. Messages are sent between the negotiation instance and service instance as SOAP request and response messages.
Credential Verifier
The credential verifier performs procedures to validate credentials. These procedures include checking the expiration date, verifying the issuer's signature, and ensuring that the credential has not been revoked. Rather than implementing this functionality in the container, the verifier relies on XKMS Web services. XKMS specifies a trust service that can be used to outsource the public key infrastructure's complexity. 11 The credential verifier communicates credentials to the XKMS Web service, which performs the credential validation and returns the result to the requester -the credential verifier. The exchange is accomplished using SOAP messages.
Credential Collector
The credential collector gathers credentials from online repositories (for example, https://digitalid. verisign.com) in cases where the requester might be unable or unwilling to submit the credential. The collector relies on the SAML specification. SAML describes and exchanges security assertions that act as credentials in our system. When the provider needs to check for a credential's existence, the credential collector uses SAML messages to request the assertion from a SAML Web service. When requested, the authority sends the assertion to the collector. The negotiation controller can then use the assertion. Messages are exchanged with SAML authorities using the SAML SOAP binding.
Future Directions
We are currently working on integrating our model with role-based access control. 14 The role concept is a powerful abstraction, especially in dynamic environments such as Web services. Requesters can submit credentials to be assigned to roles, which let them proceed in the trust negotiation.
In future work, we plan to expand on this model to include support for composite Web services where services outsource operations to several different providers. 12 Issues that need to be considered include policy composition and decomposition. Policy composition is useful in situations where the composite service is formed using bottom-up composition. Policy decomposition, on the other hand, is needed in situations where the composite service is designed using a top-down approach. It is interesting to note that policy composition is also desirable from an administrative point of view. Security policies can be difficult to comprehend for large systems; a composition of several component policies is easier to understand and administer. 
